Using state-level variation in the timing of political reforms, we find that an increase in female representation in local government induces a large and significant rise in documented crimes against women in India. Our evidence suggests that this increase is good news, driven primarily by greater reporting rather than greater incidence of such crimes. In contrast, we find no increase in crimes against men or gender-neutral crimes. We also examine the effectiveness of alternative forms of political representation: large scale membership of women in local councils affects crime against them more than their presence in higher level leadership positions. JEL Classification Numbers: J16, P16, J15, J12
Introduction
One of the most fundamental aspects of civil society is the assurance of personal safety and fair treatment under the law for all citizens. However, protecting the rights of disadvantaged groups, such as population minorities and politically under-represented citizens, has remained a challenge in many countries.
Individuals from such groups are often the target of a gamut of injustices, ranging from everyday indignities such as verbal abuse and discrimination to serious crimes including murder and even genocide. Concerned governments have considered a range of policies to prevent or redress such injustices, including welfare support, affirmative action quotas in education and jobs, legal protection and allocation of more law enforcement resources. Our paper is the first to examine the consequences of a very different policy reform on crime outcomes: greater political representation of disadvantaged groups in elected office.
Our paper makes three major contributions. First, we find strong and surprising evidence that political representation is an important means of providing voice to disadvantaged groups within the criminal justice system. The introduction of mandated political representation for women in India leads to a large and statistically significant increase in the documented number of crimes against women. We argue that this is good news for women's empowerment: considerable evidence suggests that this rise is primarily due to higher reporting, rather than an increase in the actual incidence of crime. Second, we shed light on the political architecture that maximizes female voice. It is the presence of women in the broad base of political representatives, rather than in leadership positions at higher levels of governance per se, that generates a more powerful impact on reporting of crimes. Finally, our work highlights the importance of reporting bias in the analysis of crime statistics, an issue that has been explored so far, mainly in a cross-country setting (Soares, 2004) .
How could political representatives from disadvantaged groups affect their crime outcomes? For one, members of a minority group are likely to differ in their policy formulation and implementation preferences, since their life experiences would give them a different perspective on justice.
1 In turn, this could influence the functioning of the police or law enforcement agencies, which may become more responsive to the concerns of the disadvantaged groups. Second, the presence of minority group individuals in public office could alter the nature of interaction between the advantaged and disadvantaged groups, by changing perceptions or the degree of social bias against the latter. 2 Finally, observing members of their own group in positions of public office could change the attitudes and self-confidence of the disadvantaged group. 3 In a broader sense, political representatives from disadvantaged groups could reduce injustice because they help to articulate the voice of their group members, as described by Hirschman (1970) .
In practice, accurately measuring the impact of minority group elected officials on crime outcomes is difficult. A minority individual's election may reflect the changing preferences of the electorate, or the changing social status of previously disadvantaged groups, which may directly influence crimes committed against such groups.
In our paper, we are able to address this endogeneity issue by taking 1 As the recent U.S. Supreme Court appointee Sonia Sotomayor observed, "…Our experiences as women or people of color affect our decisions...Hence, one must accept the proposition that a difference there will be by the presence of women or people of color on the bench. Personal experiences affect the facts that judges choose to see." (Sotomayor, 2002) . 2 For instance, in the U.S. context, the U.S. Kerner Commission (1968) endorsed the use of a mixed race police force as a tool to tackle law and order issues and inter-racial tensions. In India, Beaman et al (2009) demonstrate that the perceptions of women as leaders become more positive after men are exposed to women in leadership roles. 3 Jensen and Oster (2009) show that this role model effect is quite strong in India: exposure to strong women characters on cable television reduces women's reported tolerance for domestic violence and increases their decision-making authority in the household. Beaman et al (2012) find direct evidence that local female leaders in India raise the aspirations and educational attainment of girls (and their parents' aspirations for them), most likely through a role model effect. La Ferrara et al (2008) also show strong role model effects of television characters on Brazilian women.
advantage of a unique, countrywide policy experiment in India. In 1993, a constitutional amendment made it mandatory for Indian states to set aside onethird of all positions in local government councils for women. The amendment also mandated reservation for other marginalized groups (lower castes and tribes) in proportion to their population ratio. It is one of the largest such experiments implemented in the political arena. 4 Our analysis exploits the fact that the legislation, which significantly increased female representation in local leadership positions across India, was implemented at varying dates across Indian states. We can thus construct difference-in-difference estimates of the impact of political representation for women on crimes against them.
We find that the introduction of mandated political representation for women leads to a large and statistically significant increase in the number of reported crimes against women. Across all categories, documented crimes against women rose by 46%, while rapes increased by 23% and kidnapping of women showed a 13% increase. These results are robust to the inclusion of a host of controls for economic, demographic and political variables, the strength of the police force and state-specific time trends. We note that there is no significant effect on any categories of crime not specifically targeted against women (e.g.
kidnapping of men, crimes against property or crimes against public order), suggesting that there is no overall deterioration in law and order conditions or policy changes other than the political representation that are driving our results.
These findings are somewhat surprising, and potentially distressing.
We argue that this documented increase in crimes is in fact likely to be good news because it reflects improvements in reporting rather than a rise in actual crimes. Crimes where reporting biases are expected to be minimal, such as murders or suicides of women, show no significant increases after the introduction of women's political reservation. Some additional evidence from a crime victimization survey in the state of Rajasthan suggests no significant difference in the incidence of crime between villages reserved for a female leader and those that are unreserved.
Three pieces of evidence are supportive of the reporting explanation. First, survey data from Rajasthan show that women express greater willingness to report crimes to the police in villages where the village council head position is reserved for women. Second, nationwide survey data on interactions with police show both a higher degree of satisfaction and a lower likelihood of bribe payment by women when their village council is headed by a woman. Third, we find evidence of greater police responsiveness to crimes against women after the reservation policy was implemented. The number of arrests increases significantly, both for overall crimes against women and specifically for kidnapping of women, with no decline in the quality of police effort. There is no such change in arrest rates for crimes not targeted towards women. Greater responsiveness of the police to crimes against women is likely to increase women's satisfaction with them and encourage greater reporting by women victims.
In considering explanations other than reporting, one obvious hypothesis is that actual crimes against women rose sharply because of a backlash by those who resent greater female political power (the retaliation hypothesis Miguel (2005) studies the effect of economic shocks on witch-killing; Sekhri and Storeygard (2010) looks at the effects of natural disasters on crimes against women; Donohue and Levitt (2001a) examine the link between the racial profile of police offers and the racial pattern of arrests. Stevenson and Wolfers (2006) study the impact of divorce laws on violence against women, Aizer and Dal Bo (2009) investigate the effect of prosecution no-drop policies on reporting of domestic violence, while Aizer (2010) examines the effect of women's relative wages. Iyengar (2009) examines the effect of mandatory arrest laws for domestic violence, and finds that it leads to greater under-reporting of less serious incidents, and consequently a rise in the number of homicides.
local inequality and economic shocks to peer effects and family structure. 6 A number of studies (Di Tella and Schargrodsky, 2004; Levitt, 1997; Draca, Machin and Witt, 2011) examine the impact of increased police hiring on crime . We are unaware of any studies that examine the effects of elected minority representatives on crime outcomes against them.
A second stream of literature has examined the effect of increased political representation for minority groups on policy making and attitudes. 7 Many of the studies analyzing the Indian case compare outcomes across villages reserved for a female (or minority) council president and those that are not; i.e. they do not estimate the impact of increased representation among members of the village council but examine only the effect of the village council leader. 8 Our study, in contrast, focuses precisely on the impact of the change in the composition of local councils by comparing crime rates before and after the implementation of reservation across Indian states. We are also able to assess the effects of the identity of council leaders at the district level.
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The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides institutional details of the criminal justice system and mandated political representation in India, focusing specifically on the reasons for the variation in policy implementation dates across Indian states. Section 3 discusses the possible 6 See, among others, Kelly (2000) ; Donohue and Levitt (2001b); Bloch and Rao (2002) ; Demombynes and Ozler (2005) ; Fafchamps and Minten (2006) . 7 Most studies find significant positive effects of women or women-friendly leaders on femaleoriented policies (Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004; Powley, 2007; Washington, 2008; ClotsFigueras, 2011) , as well as improved attitudes towards women leaders (Beaman et al, 2009 ) and higher aspirations and educational attainment of girls (Beaman et al, 2012) . Similarly increased representation of disadvantaged castes in political office has been found to bring greater benefits for these castes (Pande, 2003; Besley et al, 2007) . A few recent studies, however, have challenged these findings (Rajaraman and Gupta, 2010; Bardhan et al, 2010; Dunning and Nilekani, 2010) . 8 The empirical strategy of these studies, which relies on the cross-sectional variation in the reservation status of the council leader position, does not permit the estimation of the impact of increased representation among council members as one-third of member positions are reserved for women in all village councils. 9 Since village level crime data are not available, we are unable to examine the impact of having a female leader at the village council level.
mechanisms through which political representation can affect crime incidence and reporting. Section 4 describes our data and empirical strategy, and Section 5 presents our main results. Section 6 discusses possible interpretations of these results, and presents evidence to distinguish between the reporting and the retaliation hypotheses. Section 7 examines the effect of female leadership at the district and state level, and Section 8 concludes. 
Mandated Political

Mandated Political Representation in Local Councils
In April 1993, the 73 rd Amendment to the Indian constitution came into force.
This Act required each state to set up a three-tier system of local government, comprising village, intermediate and district level governance bodies, collectively known as the Panchayati Raj. 10, 11 All members of these local bodies were to be 10 Certain small states were required to set up only two-tier systems of local government. 11 The village-level governing bodies (Gram Panchayats) have been known to exist in India since ancient times. However, their real power, effectiveness and representativeness have varied considerably over time. Ghatak and Ghatak (2002) Of the many components of the new law, the most salient effects on crime are likely to come from the change in the gender composition of local government councils. Law and order was not on the list of functions devolved to local governments. Fiscal decentralization has also not gone very far, with most of local governments' revenue still coming from grants from the state.
Variation in the Timing of Local Government Elections across States
Our main measure of political representation is an indicator for when women are
given political representation in a particular state, i.e. in the indicator equals one in the years following the first local government election that implemented the "not less than one-third" reservation scheme for women representatives. As 
Potential Effects of Leader Identity on Crime Incidence and Reporting
We outline a framework similar to Donohue and Levitt (2001a) that considers the incentives of three parties relevant to a crime situation: criminals, victims and the policing authority. First, a potential criminal decides whether to commit a crime or not. Next, when a crime occurs, the victim makes a decision on whether to report the crime to the police. Finally, the police must decide whether to record the crime, and how much time and effort to devote to investigating the crime and bringing the criminal to justice.
In what ways does increased female representation in local government affect the behavior of agents at each of these stages above? We examine this question working backwards, from stage 3 to stage 1, since changes in behavior of the police would influence behavior of victims and criminals in the earlier stages.
The presence of women leaders makes it more likely that police are responsive to crimes against women, i.e. that they record and investigate crimes against women more often in Stage 3 (the recording effect). The presence of female leaders at the local level might also induce the police to be more sympathetic towards female victims, either because their attitudes towards women undergo a change after observing female political leaders, 16 or because these local leaders have the ability to highlight poor behaviour by the police to higher level officials, or to the local press. As mentioned earlier, law and order is under the purview of state, not local governments in India. All higher level police officers belong to the explicitly non- politicians can have some influence on the assignment of specific officers to particular positions (see Iyer and Mani, 2010 , for an analysis of political influence on Indian bureaucrats). Since law and order was not devolved to the local government as part of the 73 rd Amendment, local representatives at the district or village level have no direct power over police appointments or budgets.
Nevertheless, they can of course lobby state level representatives and wield "soft power" in other ways, e.g. by threatening to publicize poor police response to crime victims. We examine the evidence on police responsiveness to crimes against women in detail in section 6.3.
If the police take women's grievances more seriously, victims would be more encouraged to report crimes in stage 2 (the reporting effect). 
Data and Empirical Strategy
Crime Procedures in India
The Code of Criminal Procedure provides the basis for the criminal justice system in India. This code specifies that all information given to the police must be included in a written report by the police officer, read and signed by the informant. After this "First Information Report" (FIR) has been filed, the police are required to investigate the crime, and maintain detailed police diaries of the progress of the investigation. During such investigation, the police may question or arrest any suspects.
Under the habeas corpus requirements of Indian law, all arrested persons must be produced before a magistrate and charged with a specific crime within 24 hours or be released. The police must deliver to the magistrate a report which details the results of the investigation, and whether the accused has been arrested and/or released on bail. Based on this report, the magistrate makes a decision of whether there are sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused. If he so rules, a formal chargesheet is prepared, detailing the offence with which the accused is charged. If the magistrate feels that the police report does not provide sufficient grounds on which to frame a charge, the case is dismissed at that point.
The fraction of cases in which the magistrate upholds the charges (the "chargesheeting" rate) therefore reflects in part the quality of the investigation carried out by the police. As discussed below, we will use the number of crimes reported (as captured by the FIR), the number of arrests made and the chargesheeting rate in the empirical analysis.
Data on Crime and Police Activity
We obtained data on the reported number of crimes at the district and state level from various issues of the "Crime in India" publications of the National Crime
Records Bureau (NCRB) at the Ministry of Home Affairs, for the period . These data come from the first stage of the criminal justice system, namely the filing of FIRs with the police. 18 We also have annual data on the number of arrests made for each crime category, as well as the chargesheeting rate.
Our main variable of interest is crimes against women. These include the following crime categories: rape, kidnapping of women and girls, dowry deaths, sexual harassment, molestation, cruelty by husbands or relatives, importation of women and girls, prostitution, pornography, giving and receiving dowry and sati (widow-burning). The reporting system for these crimes changes over time, as the NCRB started reporting additional crime categories separately. For instance, only rape and kidnapping of women were reported in the period before 1995, while other categories such as dowry death, molestation, sexual harassment and cruelty by husband or relatives started being recorded in 1995. Importation of women and girls was included in 2001. In all our regressions, we include year fixed effects to 18 The Criminal Procedure Code of India divides all crimes into two categories: (i) cognizablewhich are dealt by the Police, and in which a police officer may arrest a person with or without a warrant and (ii) non-cognizable -which are generally left to be pursued by the affected parties themselves in courts. Only cognizable crimes are reported in the NCRB publications.
control for such nationwide changes in reporting. We analyze separately the specific crime categories of rape and kidnapping of women and girls, which are consistently reported over a longer time period. Detailed definitions of these crime categories are available in an online Appendix.
We also examine crimes against SCs and STs, which are recorded separately by the NCRB starting in 1992, and crimes which are not genderspecific, such as property crimes or crimes against public order. It is interesting to see that crimes against women follow a very different national trend compared to other violent crimes ( Figure I ). The incidence of murders and riots shows a secular decline in the period after 1990, while the documented incidence of rapes has steadily increased.
Our data on the dates of the first local election with one-third representation of women comes from several different sources, summarized in Appendix 1. 19 The empirical analysis uses many variables at the state level. These include economic variables, such as state GDP levels, police strength, demographic variables (female-male ratio, literacy rates, urbanization), and political variables such as the presence of a female chief executive in the state.
We also examine survey data from several additional sources. We present some evidence on the quality of interactions with police from the Public Affairs
Centre's Millennial Survey, an India-wide household survey which aims to assess the functioning of a range of public services in 2000. 20 We supplement this with data on citizen perceptions of the impact of local leaders on police behavior, (Banerjee et al, 2009 ).
Empirical strategy
We conduct the analysis for the 17 major states of India over the period 1985-2007. 21 Our specification controls for a range of factors that the literature has identified as important determinants of crime rates: literacy rates, per capita incomes, male-female ratio and urbanization (Soares, 2004; Edlund et al, 2007) .
Further, we also control for whether the Chief Minister was a woman. This is to account for the possibility that we might mistakenly attribute the effect of a higher-level woman representative to a lower-level one. Finally, we also include measures of the size of the state police force as a control for varying levels of commitment to crime deterrence across states, though this might in fact be the channel through which political representation affects crime.
A further concern is that the timing of policy changes may be endogenous to the trends in crime. In addition to including state and time fixed effects, we also control for state-specific linear time trends.
Political Representation and Crime: Empirical Results
Crimes against Women
We find that political representation for women is associated with a large and significant increase in the documented crimes against women. Table III There is a considerable increase in the number of documented crimes against women, starting at the date when women's reservation is implemented.
Crimes Against Men and Gender-Neutral Crimes
Could the increase in reported crimes against women be simply a part of an overall surge in crimes following mandated political representation for women?
This could occur if the entry of inexperienced female policymakers led to a general decline in law and order or if political reservation were associated with other concurrent reforms such as changes to reporting rules, policing strategy or overall economic growth or inequality trends. 22 We therefore examine the impact of political reservation on other various categories of crime where the victims are not necessarily women, such as the kidnapping of men and boys (reported separately from 1988 onwards), crimes against property (robberies and burglaries), crimes against public order (riots and arson) and economic crimes (counterfeiting, cheating and breach of trust). None of these crime categories show any statistically significant relationship with the implementation of women's political reservations (Table IV) .
This makes us more confident that the results of Table III are indeed capturing the effect of women's political representation, rather than any other concurrent reforms that might have been implemented, or an overall increase in crime as a result of having less experienced female leaders.
Finally, we examine whether documented crimes against SCs and STs in local councils also increased after reservation was implemented. In addition to women, the Panchayati Raj policy provided for the mandated representation of these communities in local councils. Similar to the results for women, we find a significant increase in "identity crimes" against SCs after these groups obtain mandated representation in local councils (Table A1) . These refer to the crime categories under "prevention of atrocities" or "civil rights violations" which are crimes committed against SCs by upper castes, mainly on the basis of identity (e.g. discrimination, prohibiting access to public places).
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22 For the impact of overall economic growth or rising inequality on crime in India, see Prasad (2008) and Charmarbagwala and Sharma (2008) . 23 We do not find any significant results of political representation for STs on crimes committed against them (Table A1 , columns 4-6). This is probably because of the inability of STs to mobilize as effectively as SCs. Other studies on STs have also found that mandated political representation for STs has not resulted in greater access to primary schools or other types of infrastructure (Krishnan, 2007; Banerjee and Somanathan, 2007) .
6. Interpreting the Results: More Crime or More Documentation of Crime?
Political Representation of Women and Actual Crime Occurrence
Given the challenge of separating out actual increases in crime from higher reporting/recording of crime, we begin by examining categories of crime where the incidence of underreporting is likely to be the least: murders and suicides of women (for the simple reason that it is relatively hard to hide a dead body). If the overall results in Table III were primarily driven by an increase in actual crimes committed, we may expect to find some effects in these crime categories as well.
We do not find any increase in overall murder rates after women's political reservation was implemented (Table V , column 1). Focusing on murders of women, there is also no evidence of an increase following the surge in female representation in local governments. Since data on number of murders by gender are available only after 1999, we focus on the four states that enacted women's empowerment after 1999. Though the small sample size means that we are unlikely to get statistically significant results, it is nevertheless notable that the point estimate for the effects of female political representation is negative for murders of women, unlike for murders of men. (Table V , columns 2-3). Data on motives of murders are available for our entire time period. We therefore examined data on murders where the motive was stated as love affairs, sexual causes or dowry reasons as a proxy for murders of women, on the plausible assumption that most victims of such murders are likely to be female. Again, we find no significant impact of women's reservation on the number of such murders or their share in overall murders (Table V, columns 4-5). We also find no evidence of an increase in the incidence of female suicides following women's greater political role (Table V, columns 6-7). Examining data on suicides also reassures us that the lack of any effect on murder rates does not arise from murders being misclassified as suicides.
Another category of crimes that may be less prone to reporting biases is crimes against children. Although the data are limited (available only for 1994 and later), the results suggest no significant increase in such crimes after women's reservation; in fact, crimes against children show a marginally significant decline after women are given political representation (results not shown).
Is there evidence for such a deterrence effect in crimes against women?
The fact that we observe an overall increase in documented crimes against women suggests that any deterrence effect is outweighed by other factors, at least in the short run. What about longer-run effects? To address this question, we ran a specification where we included the number of years since the reform and its squared term as regressors, rather than a single post-reform dummy. We find a significant negative coefficient on the squared term, suggesting that the rise in the documented number of crimes slows down over time. In fact the total number of crimes against women starts declining 9.5 years after the reform is passed.
Similarly, the number of rapes per capita is expected to decline 20 years after the reform (results available upon request). This evidence is consistent with the interpretation that in the long run, increased police and victim responsiveness due to women leaders deters potential criminals against women, as outlined in section 3.
Is there other evidence that the increases in crime are not in fact driven by retaliation against women's empowerment? We have already documented little change in murders of women (Table V) , but this might be considered a very extreme form of retaliation against women -just as suicides may be regarded as an extreme response. Nonetheless, if there were actually an increase in crimes committed against women, it would lead to greater curtailment of their freedoms in places with women leaders. There is no evidence to that effect. Based on household level surveys of over 19,000 respondents across all states of India, a study of women's role in local governance finds very little difference across village units represented by women and men in the fraction of women requiring permission to go outside the home, to attend social events, to interact with strangers and to send girls to school (Government of India, 2008a, Table 7 .14).
For instance, 61.5% of women who are represented by women councilors reported needing permission to go out of their homes; the corresponding figure for women in areas with male representatives was 60%. Table VI suggest no evidence for actual crime incidence to be higher in village councils reserved for a female leader. These results, although based on limited survey data, corroborate our hypothesis of a lack of association between political representation and actual crimes against women.
Political Representation and Women's Willingness to Report Crimes
Although we do not have nationwide evidence on reporting of crime, the Rajasthan study discussed above includes a public opinion survey, which specifically asked respondents their willingness to report different types of 24 We also examined an alternative hypothesis that greater participation in public life may be exposing them to more crimes. One source of such exposure could be women's labor force participation, which would increase their interaction with those outside the home. However, based on the National Sample Survey data we did not find any significant increase in women's labor force participation over 1987-88 to 2004-05. 25 We augmented the Rajasthan crime victimization survey data with information on the Gram Panchayats in which the survey villages were located and the reservation status of these Gram Panchayats. We were able to match roughly 90 percent of the observations in the rural sample of the survey.
crimes. We regress indicators for the respondent's willingness to file an FIR for various crime categories on whether the respondent's village council head position is reserved for a woman. We find that women in villages where the village council head position is reserved are significantly more likely to say that they will report crimes to the police (Table VII) . We do not find any such difference in the willingness of men to report crimes. These findings, though based on limited survey data, do provide some evidence for the reporting channel.
Political Representation and Women's Experience with Law Enforcement Officials
Several previous studies have found the reluctance of police to record crimes against women to be a serious problem. Case studies report instances of the police characterizing an attempt to record a rape as a method to extort money, refusing to record domestic violence because "the husband has a right to beat the wife," and assuming that a missing girl had eloped rather than been kidnapped (National Commission for Women, 2003) . In a study using decoy crime victims, Banerjee et al (2009) find that only 50% of sexual harassment cases and 53% of domestic violence cases are registered by the police (when a male relative tries to report it on behalf of a female victim), in contrast to 92% of break-ins and more than 64% of motorcycle thefts.
These differences can also be observed when comparing data on recorded Further, data from the Millennial Survey show that women display greater satisfaction in their interactions with the police when they live in villages with a female council head (Table VIII, panel B) . 27 Women are slightly more likely to approach the police in such villages (columns 1 and 2). While the sample of respondents who actually had dealings with the police is relatively small, we do find that women in villages with female council heads were significantly more 26 These numbers are based on authors' calculations from NCRB data, assuming an average household size of 5 members. Unfortunately the lack of any previous victimization survey prevents us from comparing trends in actual crime over time. 27 Since the Millennial Survey is a single cross-section, we cannot estimate the impact of increase female presence among village council members, but only the effect of reservation for women of the village council head position.
likely to say that the police solved their case (column 3) and significantly less likely to pay bribes to the police (column 7). They were also somewhat less likely to say that the police refused to register their complaint (column 5). We should note that the difference in women's responses across villages that did and did not have women council heads was larger than the difference for men in all these cases. These results are indicative of a positive change in police attitudes towards crimes against women, in the presence of women leaders. We find a similar result in the J-PAL crime survey from Rajasthan state: women are less likely to pay a bribe to file a police report in women-reserved villages (results available upon request).
Political Representation and Police Action
The most direct evidence of police responsiveness comes from police action. We examine data on the number of arrests and chargesheeting rates to shed some light on this issue. Our data on police activity shows that the number of arrests per 1000 people for crimes against women increases by nearly 30% after women's reservation is implemented (Table IX , column 1). Arrests for rape also show an increase of 9%, and arrests for kidnapping of women increase by a statistically significant 15% (columns 2-3). For crimes not targeted at women, the impact is smaller and statistically insignificant (Table IX, columns 4-5) .
Does this increased police arrest activity come at the cost of the quality of investigation? We examine the impact of political empowerment of women on chargesheeting rates i.e. the fraction of cases in which the police report about the crime is held up by a magistrate and results in a formal chargesheet against the accused. As shown in columns (8)- (9) of Table IX , political empowerment of women has no statistically significant effect on chargesheeting rates. 28 Hence, 28 Chargesheeting rate for crimes against women is computed as the average of the chargesheeting rate for the following crime categories: rape, kidnapping of women and girls, dowry deaths, there is no evidence of a decline in the quality of police action with increased political representation of women either.
Finally, in order to assess whether the authorities became more responsive to female victims, we also examined data on convictions over the period [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] . Analysis of convictions is complicated by the prolonged delays in the Indian criminal justice system, which means that convictions recorded in a given year are likely to be based on arrests for crimes committed several years earlier.
We find a positive association between women's political representation 3-5 years earlier and current conviction rates for crimes against women; there is no effect on crimes not targeted towards women (results available upon request).
29
We summarize our key results as follows: we do not find any indication that increased political representation of women is associated with an actual increase in crimes against them. On the other hand, several different pieces of evidence point to greater police responsiveness to crimes against women (the recording effect) and a greater willingness of women to report crimes (the reporting effect). This implies that the observed rise in documented crimes against women (Table III) is in fact good news: it represents a greater ability of women to get crimes recorded and is therefore an important first step towards obtaining justice. Political representation thus significantly improves the voice of women in the criminal justice system.
Women's Political Representation: At What Level Does It Matter?
Beginning with Hirschman (1970) , social scientists have recognized the importance of voice for the survival and success of any organization, be it a molestation, sexual harassment, cruelty by husbands or relatives and importation of girls. These rates are not separately available for other crime categories, hence we cannot report the chargesheeting rate for "all crimes other than those against women." 29 The conviction rate is computed as the ratio of the number of convictions to the number of crimes committed.
country or a firm. However, we know very little about the specific forms of representation that maximize effective voice. For instance, in our context, are the benefits to women maximized by being represented in more influential positions at higher levels of governance, or by large scale representation at the lower level?
We are able to address this question by using the fact that, in addition to village presidents, as well as village and district council member positions, onethird of district council chairperson positions in India were also reserved for women, by rotation across districts. While all districts within a state have an identical (one-third) fraction of their council membership reserved for women, they do differ in whether the chairperson position is reserved for women. A priori, it is not obvious whether the impact of women district chairpersons will be larger or smaller than that of female district council members and sub-district level representatives. If district chairpersons have a greater degree of influence with local police, their impact on crime may be larger, while if the greater proximity of village level leaders to both the police and the victims is a major factor, then having a female district chairperson might not have much additional impact.
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We collected data on the reservation status of the district chairperson in 10 out of our 17 major states. 31 We run the following specification, similar to the state-level regression in (1):
where the dependent variable is the number of crimes per capita in the district (in logs We find that, in any given year, having the district chairperson post reserved for women had a low marginal impact on crime outcomes, over and above the effects of state-level implementation of local council reservations.
( Table X Finally, we extend our analysis to consider the effects of having women members in the state legislative assembly (MLAs). We should note that women are significantly under-represented at these levels of government, where no mandated representation rules are in place. In our data set, only 5.5% of the state legislators in any given year are female. We run a regression specification similar to (1), except that the independent variable of interest is the fraction of female MLAs in power at the state level (Table IX, Panel B) . Since this fraction is potentially endogeneous, we instrument for the fraction of women MLAs using the fraction of closely contested elections (with winning margin less than 5%)
where the winner was female. 32 We should note that the OLS and IV coefficients show a positive relationship between women's representation and reported crime, though none of these coefficients are statistically significant at the 5% level.
Conclusions
This paper demonstrates that political voice is an important determinant of access to justice for socially disadvantaged groups. We provide one of the first systematic analyses of the effects of mandated political representation for women on crime outcomes against them, using data from the Panchayati Raj experiment in India. Furthermore, we shed light on the relative effectiveness of alternative forms of political representation for minority empowerment.
We find that having female political representation at the local government level induces strong positive and significant effects on the willingness and ability of women to get crimes against them recorded. It induces greater responsiveness of law enforcement officials to crimes against women, as measured by the number of arrests and the quality of women's interactions with police. Most of the effects are driven by the increase in broad-based representation of women in local government councils at the district and village level, rather than women in district leadership positions. We find a similar result for the case of SCs: despite already enjoying mandated representation at higher levels of government, we find that representation of SCs in local councils leads to increased reporting of crimes where the victims are specifically targeted because of their caste.
Crime against disadvantaged minorities and under-reporting of such crime is a problem in both developing and developed countries. Encouraging victims to report such crimes is a crucial first step, both in understanding the magnitude of the problem, and in ensuring justice. Our work shows the key role that local women can play in facilitating this process. Our insights on the identity of local leaders in ensuring access to justice are likely equally valuable for other racial, religious or ethnic minorities. "Others" in column (4) include state legislators, caste leaders, religious leaders and elders outside your family. Don't know responses coded as "no" for columns (5)-(8).
The difference between column (5) and (6) is statistically significant at the 1% level; similarly for the difference between columns (7) and (8 Each cell represents the coefficient on the post-reform dummy for the outcome variables with appropriate controls. Post-reform dummy equals 1 for years after the first local government elections with reservations for women. *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Figure II Year-by-year Effects of Women's Empowerment
Notes: Each point on the graph represents the impact of women's representation on total crimes against women after a given number of years. The zero point on the X-axis represents the year of the reform; the dates of reform vary across states as documented in Table 2 . 
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